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Since the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973
i
military recruiters have been relatively successful in
attracting sufficient volunteers to maintain authorized
force levels. Table 1 provides a summary of non-prior
service accessions into the all-volunteer force for fiscal

























1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 I98I
2127 2091 2093 2085 2056 2052 2080
2149 2081 2074 2061 2027 2050 2082
































































The lower career reenlistment rates of the past few
years as illustrated in Table 2 highlight the shortfall in
experienced personnel the armed forces have been facing
(Hunter and Nelson, 1979, p. 17).
Table 2
Reenlistment Rates {%)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
First Term
Army 39 21 33 36 43 51 55
Navy 4o 35 37 4o 38 37 42
Air Foirce 40 37 39 41 38 36 43
Marine Corps 20 26 29 29 20 23 27
DoD 37 30 35 37 37 39 43
Career
Army 75 71 70 69 66 69 73
Navy 80 75 68 64 62 67 73
Air Force 90 82 86 82 82 82 86
Marine Corps 73 78 72 69 52 50 74
DoD 82 76 75 72 68 71 77
Total
Army 53 43 52 54 56 62 68
Navy 58 50 49 50 47 48 55
Air Force 68 62 66 66 60 60 66
Marine Corps 34 41 43 42 34 35 43
DoD 57 50 54 55 53 55 61
Table 2 demonstrates that, historically, approximately
one half of all military personnel eligible for discharge
from active duty are discharged during any given fiscal
year. Because of the ever increasing technological com-
plexity of modern military hardware, there is a growing
need to retain personnel who have been trained in various
occupations or, failing this, to find some other means of
filling the experience shortfall. Two methods of filling
11

that gap are to recruit occupationally experienced non-prior
service individuals or to persuade personnel with prior
military service to reenlist in the armed forces. This
thesis explores the latter approach; the prospects and
utility of recruiting individuals with previous military
experience.
For all practical purposes, prior to the all-volunteer
force the armed forces of the United States considered man-
power- a free commodity. This was perhaps due to a military
'draft mentality' that viewed the supply of entry level
personnel as relatively inexhaustible. However, with the
end of the draft in 1973 » "the armed forces have been forced
to compete for personnel in the open labor market. Each
service must now compete for scarce manpower with industry,
higher education, and other occupations, as well as with the
three other services. Indeed, for a significant portion of
the labor pool, especially among the minorities and unskilled,
the military must even compete with welfare. The substantial
benefits of welfare are often perceived to far outweigh what-
ever inducements are offered by the armed forces (Muller,
1979, p. A-3).
The available pool of 17-20 year-olds is dwindling
(Muller, 1979» p. A-3). Over the past decade the national
birth rate has declined substantially. As indicated in
Fig. 1.1, demographers expect that by the turn of the century
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17-20 Year-Old Supply, 1977-1997
Fig. 1.1
Moreover, not every 17-20 year-old, male or female,, is
eligible for military service. Each recruit must meet
minimum moral, mental and physical standards as set by the
respective services in order to be eligible for enlistment
into a particular service.
Along with the declining birth rate of the past decade,
there has been a decrease in the overall educational quality
of young recruits. W. E. Muller of George Washington Univer-
sity who has written several papers on forecasting for total
force planning, has stated the following:
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"With the general descrease of educational standards,
the bilingual education requirements being used as a tool
of advantage by ethnic minority groups, the 'black
language' ruling, the issuance of certificates of attend-
ance in lieu of graduation diplomas, the influx of less
qualified refugees (boat people and chicanos) , and the
'permissiveness' of parents, the capability of the recruit
is deteriorating" (Muller, 1979. p. A-9)
One indication of the increasing complexity of hardware
with which modern military personnel must be proficient has
been the growth in the number of pages of technical manuals
for aircraft (Fig. 1.2). Currently, the Air Force is
rewriting and downgrading, at a considerable cost, its
maintenance manuals from an eleventh grade level of compre-
hension to a ninth grade level (Muller, 1979. p. A-9). The
decreasing recruit capabilities have led to increased
training costs (Muller, 1979. p. A-10).
The spectacular developments in hardware systems, coupled
with the unprecedented advances in command and control tech-
nology and the introduction of space technology, have
imposed heavy requirements on the armed forces for experi-
enced manpower (Binkin and Kyriakopoulos , 1979. p. 17). The
experience acquired during the informal education process of
on-the-job training, learning by trial and error, and the
repetition of tasks is cumulative. These experiences enable
personnel to improve their performance as they acquire knowl-
edge and know-how (Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, 1979. p. 29-30)-
For example, a 1977 study by Horowitz and Sherman on crew











































hypothesis that experienced personnel make more productive
technicians (Horowitz and Sherman, 1977)
•
The overwhelming evidence from recent studies by Binkin
and Kyriakopoulos (1979). Horowitz and Sherman (1977).
DeTray (1981), Hawkins (1979) and others points to a
increased need for experienced personnel in the military and
for less dependence on the "youth and vigor" philosophy of
earlier years.
Table 3 provides data which contrast the job-staffing
practices of the civilian sector and each of the armed
services. The table also indicates roughly the extent to
which improvements can be made in the job-staffing practices
of the armed services. The improvements to be made would
come from a shift toward a more mature force within the
technical fields and a reduction in the number of first
termers within the occupational categories. This may also
help to abolish the age-old military "up or out" promotion
policies. It has been demonstrated in the civilian sector
(most notably in the aircraft maintenance field) that an
individual can be productive and happy and remain in a
single grade for an indefinite period of time, provided
he/she receives the necessary benefits and pay raises
(Muller, 1979. p. 9). There is no need for the military to
perpetrade the Peter Principle by continuing to promote each




Age Distribution of Military Enlisted Personnel
by Service, and of Civilian Sector Male Workers
by Major Occupational Category, 1977
Percent
Major occupational Age
category 17-24 25-34 35-44 Over 44-
Technical workers
Civilian sector 10 35 23 32
Army 56 32 11 1
Navy 54 33 12 1
Air Force 45 35 18 2
Marine Corps 67 25 7 1
Clerical workers
Civilian sector 25 25 16 34
Army 47 35 16 2
Navy 42 38 18 2
Air Force 37 39 22 2
Marine Corps 61 26 12 1
Craftsmen
Civilian sector 17 27 21 35
Army 66 25 "8 1
Navy 57 30 12 1
Air Force 53 33 13 1
Marine Corps 72 22 6 *
Other(a)
Civilian sector 40 20 13 28
Army 65 26 8 1
Navy 4-0 37 21 2
Air Force 56 30 13 1
Marine Corps 84 13 3 #
* Less than 1 percent
a. For civilian sector, includes nonfarm laborers and
service workers.
For military, includes "service and supply handlers" and
"infantry, gun crews, and seamanship specialists"
categories.
From Table 3 i"t would appear that the services with the
largest concentration of technicians and craftsmen- -the Navy
and the Air Force—would stand to gain the most by moving
17

toward a more experienced work force. However, the data
also suggest that the Army and Marine Corps should consider
utilizing more experienced personnel in all occupational
areas (Binkin and Kyriakopoulos , 1979. p. 36).
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
It is only recently that interest has been shown by
researchers in the area of military recruitment of prior
service individuals. Moreover, while veterans have always
been a small portion of military accessions, recruiters have
not really focused hard on inducing veterans to return to
military service. An exception, however, would be when
certain ratings are needed for events such as the recommis-
sioning of the battleship New Jersey.
Since veteran recruitment by the military is a relatively
new research area, there is very little reported in the
literature regarding either this subject or that of prior
service accessions. Most of the literature reviewed for
this thesis consists of background articles, such as those
which deal with possible reasons for manpower shortages and
poor quality recruits (Muller, 1979) and the need to recruit
experienced personnel (Binkin and Kyriakoloulos , 1979).
There are two articles which deal directly with the
question of prior service accessions: one, a thesis written
by a Naval Postgraduate School graduate, R. B. Hawkins, LCDR,
USN; the other is a contracted study prepared by D. DeTray of
Rand Corporation. The Hawkins study focuses on the
18

effectiveness of the Navy's recruiting of veterans while
DeTray explores in detail the demographic make-up of prior
service individuals.
The purpose of Hawkins' (1979) thesis was to explore the
effectiveness of the six Navy Recruiting Areas in the
recruitment of prior service Navy veterans (NAVETS) for the
years FY I975-I978 (pp. k & 22). Hawkins examined trends
in four general areas: (1), the overall performance trends
in prior service recruiting; (2), demographic time trends by
fiscal wear for prior service NAVETS; (3). occupational time
trends and regional accession trends by fiscal wear and
recruiting area for NAVETS, and.(^), NAVETS geographic
accession trends, with the six Navy recruiting areas forming
the geographic divisions, analyzed by demographics and
occupational groupings (p. 22). Individuals studied in
Hawkins thesis were an aggregate of prior service Navy veterans
plus other service veterans. Individual Navy veteran prior
service enlistment data for the time period 1 July 1975
through 30 September 1978 was utilized (p. 22). The data
were collected from five primary sources: the USAREC
DoD-edited file, the USAREC DoD-edited cohort file for
FY1975. the USAREC DoD-edited file (compared with the edited
BUPERS Enlisted Master Record) , BUPERS Report - NAVPERS
I5658 and the Commander Navy Recruiting Command Production
Summary Report (p. 27).
Hawkins found that approximately 50% of the male NAVETS
reenlisting were between the ages of 20 and 25* During the
19

time period considered, there was a slow but steady increase
in the percentage of NAVETS in the 20 to 25 year-old age
group reenlisting. This increase was associated with a
decrease in the percentages of NAVETS reenlisting from the
26 to 30 year-old age group (pp. 35-36).
Hawkins, using a chi-square test, determined that there
was a significant statistical relationship between the entry
paygrade of a NAVET and the year in which the enlistment
occurred (p. 37) • His analysis of marital status indicated
that a greater proportion of the NAVETS reenlisting were
single (p. 37)' Navy veteran reenlistment by race demon-
strated a consistent pattern over the years analyzed (FY1975-
FY1978). "The percentages of Caucasian, black and other
NAVET accessions have remained within one percentage point
of a distribution of 86%, and 2% respectively (p. ^2)."
Factors analyzed in the Hawkins study indicate that
potential market targeting within an area might be accom-
plished by using demographic data available from separation
files (p. 69). Analysis of the prior service veterans
attrition indicated that the E-3 and E-4 prior service
enlistee experienced a lower rate of attrition than did the
non-prior service enlistee (p. 69).
Hawkins' study indicated that certain distinctions
probably exist among different regions of the country with
respect to the Navy's ability to attract the prior service
veteran for reenlistment. Hawkins also stated that with
20

more specific and in-depth analysis of the market in each
Navy recruiting district, more effective prior service
recruiting programs could be developed to meet existing
service needs (pp. 72-73)-
DeTray (1981) explored in some detail an alternative
source of military manpower: veterans who are currently
employed in the civilian sector in jobs with close military
counterparts (p. v) . Using the 1979 Current Population
Survey (CPS) and the I966-I976 National Longitudinal Survey
of Young Men (NLS), DeTray explored some of the civilian and
military characteristics of the prior service accessions
pool. Based on data retrieved from the 1979 CPS, DeTray
found that for the most part veterans were employed (p. vii)
,
Approximately one half of those veterans who served short
terms and had only recently separated from the military
earned less at their civilian jobs than they would had
they returned to active duty (p. vii). However, for
veterans in their thirties with significant military and
civilian experience, only about one fifth would earn more by
returning to active duty (p. viii)
.
DeTray examined prior service accessions in detail to
determine whether this group would serve as a basis for
further analysis (p. k) . He concluded that the area of




"Depending on the degree of disaggregation required,
the NIjS data, in conjunction with information from CPS
files, could allow manpower planners to estimate the
size of veteran pools by a variety of civilian and
military characteristics" (p. 3*0 •
There are presently several projects under way which
focus on prior service accession. Dennis DeTray of Rand
Corporation is continuing his project; the Naval Personnel
Research and Development Center, San Diego, has a project
under the directorship of Meryl Baker, and S. Stephenson
of Perm State University has "been contracted by the Navy
Recruiting Command to conduct studies in the field of
prior service accessions.
C. PRESENT POLICY
Present policies concerning the reenlistment of veterans
are not attractive for veteran recruitment. Indeed they are
generally punitive in that veterans take a reduction in pay
on reentering the military. There has been, and still is
very little direct effort made by the military to attract
the prior service individual back to active duty. Those who
do return to active duty do so mainly on their own
initiative.
Eligibility requirements for prior service accessions
differ from those of non-prior service in two main areas:
age and training. Prior service individuals are not limited
to the 17 to 35 age bracket as are non-prior service
personnel, but may only exceed the upper limit if they have
three years of service and their age does not exceed 35 plus
22

their years of service up to a maximum age of 55 > For
example, in the Navy an individual may reenlist at any age
to 55 provided he can complete enough active duty time to
qualify for transfer to the fleet reserve prior to reaching
his 55^h birthday or 30 years of active duty prior to age
65. On the other hand, education requirements for prior
service and non-prior service personnel are generally equal.
The major difference between the prior service and non-
prior service accessions is in training requirements.
Previous training is not required for non-prior service
personnel and each recruit is required to attend basic
training. Prior service personnel are restricted by their
previous occupational specialty training as to available
programs under which they may reenlist unless their training
in the civilian sector is more useful to the particular
service at that point in time. A prior service individual
may also be required to repeat basic training before
reporting to his ultimate duty station. The need for basic
training is determined by the length of time an individual
has been off active duty. For a person reenlisting in the
Navy the broken service time limit is four years. After
this, a reenlistee must attend basic training a second time.
The Army grants a five year length of broken service before
attendance at a recruit training camp is mandatory.
23

The availability of advanced training and/or other
programs available to the prior service accession depends on
several factors: paygrade at the time of initial separation,
length of service, occupational specialty, and, finally,
length of broken service.
Each of the services is generally alike in its policies
regarding reenlistment of prior service personnel, with
differences occurring in time limits, programs available,
and quotas. Navy applicants who separated in paygrade E-^
and above with less than four years of broken service must
apply for reenlistment in Group A or B of the Open Rates/
Skills list (Appendix A) , and pass a substitute Navy-wide
advancement examination for the rate and rating desired
(COMNAVCRuTTCOMINST II30.8B, 1982, p. 5-3) . The term of re-
enlistment is 2-6 years, depending on the program for which
an individual is enlisting, the reenlistment code and the
paygrade at the time of release from active duty.
Applicants in paygrade E-4 and above with greater than
four years of broken service must apply for reenlistment
through the Direct Procurement Enlistment Program (DPEP)
which may place an individual in a critically manned rating
in a petty officer status, paygrade E-^J- through E-7
(COMNAVCRUITCOMINST II3O.8B, 1982, p. 6-IV-2) . If a reen-
listing individual possesses a valid Navy Enlisted Classifi-
cation Code record and test scores meet or exceed the
requirements, no qualification tests are required. The
2k

term of enlistment under DPEP is four years. One penalty in
the reenlistment of prior service personnel in the Navy is
that if they reenlist and subsequently retire, any severance
or adjustment pay previously received will be recouped from
their retirement pay (COMNAVCRUITCOMINST ll.30.8B, 1982, p.
5-3).
For a prior service accession some of the most important
regulations are those which establish his reentry paygrade.
Generally, the longer the length of broken service, the
lower the entry paygrade. The penalty for broken service
depends upon the length of broken service and the individual's
separation paygrade. The Army sets out its reenlistment
options fairly explicitly in Army Regulation 601-210.
For example, an Army veteran who leaves the service in
paygrade E-l through E-6 with six or fewer years of active
duty may reenlist within twenty-four months of separation at
their separation paygrade. Those individuals with seven to
ten years of active duty may not reenlist within three
months of separation and must accept a reduction of one
paygrade if they reenlist with three to thirty months of
broken service. Individuals who have been separated for
thirty to thirty-five months must accept a reduction of two
paygrades below their separation paygrade and someone who
has been separated for thirty-six months or more must accept
a reduction of three paygrades (De Tray, 1981 , p. 9). Table
^ summarizes the Army's paygrade regulations for prior











































As determined by Cdr USAEEA
,
but at least one paygrade
lower than separation
paygrade
SOURCE: Army Regulation 601-210, Table 2-6, p. 2-11.
These guidelines apply to the Army specifically, but the
same trend of lowering reentry paygrade with increased
length of separation is found in the other Services.
a. Reentry paygrade is never lower than E-2 unless
separation paygrade was E-l.
The regulations governing the return of a veteran to
active duty tend to penalize the older and more experienced
individuals who are needed in today's technically oriented
armed forces.
The succeeding chapters of this thesis explore several
prior service accession questions. Chapter II will look at
the available pool of prior service personnel with regard to
total numbers and quality as determined by education level,
mental category and character of service. Chapter III will
26

explore the characteristics of those personnel with broken
service who have returned to active duty from July 1975 to
September I98I. Chapter IV will analyze the attrition of
these prior service accessions. That is, those individuals
who are released from active duty prior to completion of
their contract. Chapter V will summarize conclusions made
in the preceeding chapters and elaborate on policy
recommendations concerning prior service accessions.
27

II. THE AVAILABLE POOL
This study of prior service accessions begins with an
analysis of the pool of personnel available for reenlist-
ment. For purposes of this study a veteran available for
reenlistment is defined as a veteran who has served a
minimum of two years on active duty and is between the ages
of 19 and 35« The lower value of 19 allows an individual
who initially enlisted at age 17 to have completed two years
on active duty while the upper value of 35 is the legal
maximum age at which an individual may enlist without an age
waiver. Over the time period 1 July 1975 "to 30 September
1981 approximately 3.5^-2,000 male veterans were discharged
from active duty with at least two years of active duty
service. Upon discharge from active duty an individual is
assigned a reenlistment eligibility code which is based upon
his character of service and the reason for separation as
indicated by an Interservice Separation Code (ISC). For
purposes of this study personnel were grouped into three
reenlistment categories. An individual, upon discharge, was
either eligible or ineligible for reenlistment or his
reenlistment eligibility was unknown.
From 1 July 1975 to 30 September I98I 57.96% of the
approximately 3 > 5^2, 000 discharges were categorized as
eligible for reenlistment. Those ineligible to reenlist
accounted for y? . 5^% of the total while only h,$l% were in








Eligible Ineligible Unknown Total
Army 57-58 36. 71 5-71 1,399,562
Navy 55.26 ^0.9^ 3-79 775,357
Air
Force 62.16 33-35 ^9 1,007,287
Marine
Corps 53.^5 ^5-10 1.^5 360,080
DoD 57.96 37-5^ ^.51 3,5^2,286
A. AGE AT SEPARATION
The number of 19 to 35 year-old personnel separating
account for <^6.47% of the total number of discharges for the
period in question, FYI975-FYI98I . They also account for
55' 0% of the total number of veterans eligible for reen-
listment, and 32.^14% of the total ineligible for reenlist-
ment. Table 6 illustrates the reenlistment eligibility of
the available pool by each age between the ages of 19 and
35' Noteworthy is the data for 19 year-olds of which the
majority, 58.51$, are ineligible to reenlist.
For each age the percent eligible for reenlistment
increases slightly but steadily up to age 3^ at which time










19 35-24 58.51 6.24
20 4-8.81 45. 90 5.29
21 61.89 33-68 4.44
22 69-97 26.09 3.94
23 71.57 24.21 4.22
24 72.04 23.08 4.88
25 72.43 21.63 5.94
26 74.62 18.84 6.55
27 75-28 17.74 6.98
28 75-27 17.75 6.98
29 76.88 15.78 7.34
30 78.30 13.50 8.19
31 79.02 12.48 8.50
32 78.92 12.26 8.82
33 81. 94 9.48 8.58
34 82.73 7.84 9.44




















Table 7 looks at the age at separation data in another
light. That is, within the age group of 19 to 35 » the
percentage of the total group accounted for by each age-
eligibility category. Each individual has served at least
two years on active duty therefore those separating between
the ages of 19 and 23 are assumed to be separating at the
conclusion of or during their first enlistment based on the
fact that the majority of enlistments are for four years.
As indicated by the data in Table 7, 51
•
3% of the
reenlistment eligible personnel are in the 19 to 23 year-old
bracket. Within this same age bracket 68.6$ of the reen-
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19 1.17 5.10 2.54
20 6.3O 15.51 8.36
21 13.97 19.91 12.27
22 17.55 17.14 12.09
23 12.32 10.91 8.09
24 8.16 6.85 6.77
25 6.49 5.08 6.52
26 6.25 4.13 6.71
27 5.42 3.3^ 6.15
28 4.13 2.55 4.69
29 3.45 1.86 4.04
30 3.22 1.46 4.13
31 2.61 1.08 3.44
32 2.09 .85 2.86
33 2.26 .69 2.90
34 2.48 .61 3.46
35 2.10 2.94 4.18
(N) 1129442 431365 92265
of the unknown eligibility fall into this age bracket. The
large percentage of ineligible personnel in this age bracket
may indicate that they did not complete their initial term
of enlistment, first term attrites.
B. EDUCATION LEVEL
The education level of separating personnel was grouped
into two major categories; high school graduates and non-
high school graduates. The high school graduate (HSG)
category includes all personnel who possess a high school
diploma plus those who have some college. The non-high
school graduate (NHS) category includes all personnel who do
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not possess a high school diploma plus those who have
attained a General Education Diploma (G.E.D.). Table 8
indicates that for the Department of Defense the majority of
separating high school graduates are eligible for reenlist-
ment while the majority of non-high school graduates are
ineligible for reenlistment. This same trend holds for each
service with the exception of the Air Force. Although not a
very large difference, the percentage of non-high school
graduates separating from the Air Force eligible for reen-
listment is higher than those that are ineligible. The Air
Force also has the highest percentage of unknown eligibility
among non-high school graduates. This may account for the
small difference between the eligible and ineligible cate-
gories and the Air Force may in-fact be more in-line with the
other services in the area of non-high school graduate
eligibility.
Table 8






























































On 1 January 1976 the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB) was introduced as the single DoD test to
replace the various aptitude test batteries then in use by
each Service. The scores obtained by an individual on the
ASVAB are used for two purposes: (1) they help to determine
individuals eligible for enlistment and (2) they are used
to establish qualifications for assignment to specific
military occupations. The ASVAB consists of ten subtests,
as shown in Table 9« Research and experience have demon-
strated that these ten subtests are acceptable predictors of
success in various types of military job training.
Table 9
The Ten Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Subtests
ASVAB Subtests
(Forms 8, 9. and 10)
* Arithmetic Reasoning * General Science
* Numerical Operations * Mathematics Knowledge
* Paragraph Comprehension * Electronics Information
* Word Knowledge * Mechanical Comprehension
* Coding Speed * Automotive Shop Information
The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score is a
combination of an individuals ' ASVAB subtest scores in the
four areas of word knowledge, paragraph comprehension,
arithmetic reasoning, and numerical operation. An individuals'
AFQT score, supplemented by scores on various composites of
apptitude subtests, is used in conjunction with educational,
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medical, and moral standards to determine an applicant's
eligibility to enter specific military occupational categories
An error in the calibration of the ASVAB form used from
January 1976 to September 1980 resulted in inaccurate cate-
gory designations for some recruits thus inflating the AFQT
scores of low-scoring enlistees. The miscalibration problem
was corrected by an introduction of a new and properly cali-
brated test form in October 1980. Additionally, the
inflated test score for 1976-1980 were recomputed and the
corrected norms made available. The recomputation of test
scores resulted in a significant decrease in the percentages
of mental category III recruits and a corresponding increase
in Category IV-V enlistees. The data presented throughout
this thesis on mental category of personnel is based upon
the recomputed scores and thus standardized with the other
years in question.
Historically, the largest percentages of accessions have
been in mental categories II, IIIA and IIIB (Table 10).
This is by policy design, however the data presented in
Table 10 indicates that for the period 1 July 1975 to 30
September I98I category IV-V personnel accounted for a
larger percentage of accessions than did category I, 9«02%
versus ^.46% respectively. It should be noted that over the
time period in question the Air Force did not recruit any
personnel in mental category V and the Marine Corps only
3^

accessed 1 person in category V. Therefore the data
presented for mental category IV-V is primarily Army and
Navy accessions.
Table 10
DoD - Available Pool
AFQT (Mental Category)
FY1975-FY1981
I II IIIA IIIB IV-V UNK
N 158039 977391 676043 780144 319525 631144
4.46 27.59 19.08 22.02 9.02 17-82
Because of the technological advances in military hard-
ware and command and control systems there has been a push
to recruit only from upper mental category personnel,
I-IIIA. Table 11 demonstrates the character of service as
indicated by individual eligibility to reenlist for all
mental categories for those individuals separating from
active duty between 1 July 1975 and 30 September I98I. As
the data indicates, the majority of personnel in each mental
category are eligible for reenlistment. Noteworthy is the
apparent inversion at the mental category IIIB and IV-V
point indicating that a larger percentage of category IV-V
personnel are eligible for reenlistment than category IIIB
personnel.
Over all mental categories the majority, 57.96% of
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Within the armed forces an accepted proxy measure of
individual experience and skill level is paygrade. For this
reason the approximate skill level of the available pool is
estimated by using separation paygrade. Historically, the
majority of individuals separate from active duty in
paygrade E-4 or E-5« The attainment of these paygrades is
commensurate with the length of service requirements for
advancement which can be reached during the initial term of
enlistment, normally 4 to 6 years. Thus indicating that the
majority of separations occur at the end of the first
enlistment.
Table 12 presents the eligibility for reenlistment by
paygrade at the time of separation of" the available pool for
the time period FY1975-FY1981 . The data indicates that the
majority of non-rated (E-l to E-3) personnel who separated
were ineligible to reenlist. There is a dramatic jump at
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the E-4 level for all services in the percent of separating
personnel eligible for reenlistment. For Dod, the percent
eligible reaches a peak at the E-5 level and begins a
decline to the E-8 level at which time the number of ineli-
gible personnel becomes the majority. Within each service
the percent ot eligibles reaches its peak at a different
paygrade and the shift to ineligible occurs at a different
point. Individual service data is presented in Appendix B.
However, the shift from eligible to ineligible among the
senior personnel, E-7 to E-9, is commensurate with a twenty
-
year length of service and retirement.
Table 12



















































E. LENGTH OF SERVICE
Table 13 lists the total active federal military service
(TAFMS) for those individuals separating from active duty in
FYI975 through FY1981. The length of service is in months
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for Table 13 and initially starts at the 2k month point.
From the two-year point to the seven-year point the table is
grouped by six month intervals, after that, in 2h month
intervals until the 30 year point is reached at which time
there is a 60 month interval due to the small number of
personnel in this group. The majority, 60.86%, of separ-
ations occurred prior to, or at the 72 month point indicating
that most enlistees separate at the end of the first enlist-
ment. Table 13 indicates that for the most part separating
personnel are eligible for reenlistment until they reach the
217-2^0 month point, 18 to 20 years, at which time the
eligibility for reenlistment shifts dramatically to the
ineligible category. There is also a shift at the 25-30
month point to the ineligible category due most likely to no
service having a term of enlistment between two and three
years and these separations are occurring prior to comple-
tion of the enlistment contract. There are peaks at the
36, 48 and 72 month points for the eligible category which
coincides with the successful completion of 3» ^ and 6 year
enlistment contracts. After the 72 month point there is a
steady rise in the percent of those eligible for reenlist-
ment to the 240 month (20 year) point, at which time the
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The data presented indicates that the majority of people
separate after the first term of enlistment and are eligible
for reenlistment. However, the majority of 19 year-olds
separating from active duty are ineligible for reenlistment




Overall, the majority of high school graduates separating
are eligible for reenlistment while the majority of non-high
school graduates are ineligible for reenlistment.
Mental category does not appear to play a large part in
the eligibility of an individual to reenlist. The percent
of personnel in the upper mental categories eligible for
reenlistment is greater than for mental category IV-V.
Eligible personnel are the majority for each mental
category.
A decided majority of non-rated (E-l to E-3) personnel
separations are ineligible to reenlist. The majority of
individuals separating in paygrades E-^ to E-6 are eligible
for reenlistment. Senior enlisted personnel E-7 to E-9. are
ineligible for reenlistment. This is commensurate with the
completion of a twenty-year career.
Eligibility to reenlist, by length of service, peaks at
intervals which coincide with normal enlistment contract
lengths. After the six-year point the percentage of
eligible personnel increases to the twenty-year point at
which time the majority of personnel are ineligible.
^0

III. THE PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSANT
Prior service accessions analyzed in this chapter were
drawn from the eligible pool discussed in the previous
chapter. In this thesis a veteran is considered to have had
prior service only if he completed a minimum of two years on
active duty. Time served in the reserves is not considered
as active duty. Since each of the services has a different
definition of prior service, ranging from 2^4- hours on active
duty for the Army, to 6 months for the Air Force, a common
starting point had to be determined for this study. The
common length of service was set at two years of active
duty.
The criterion of two years of active duty was used to
eliminate those who did not successfully complete recruit
training or who, for one reason or another, were discharged
early. The two-year time limit should give most individuals
the time to complete recruit training, basic skill training,
and to reach an operational unit for first hand experience.
The two year time limit is the minimum term of enlistment
for which an individual may enlist in any branch.
41

A. AGE AT SEPARATION
The first aspect of the prior service accession explored
in this study was age at initial separation from active
duty. Many studies contrasting military and civilian labor
forces point to the age disparities of their labor forces
with the younger military work force due to its focus on
youth and vigor (Binkin and Kyriakolpoulos , 1979)
•
Over the years FY1975-FY1981 the military accessed
approximately 106,000 male prior service accessions, only
3.02% of the prior service personnel available. Individuals
aged 16 and below have been omitted from the data as errors
while those aged 17 and 18 were omitted as probably reserv-
ists not previously screened out and therefore ineligible
for consideration in this study.
A comparison over FY1975-FY1981 of the distribution of
age at time of first enlistment and the distribution of age
at initial separation given in Fig. 3.1 indicates that the
majority of first enlistments occur between the ages of 17
and 20 while the majority of initial separations occur
between the ages of 27 and 23. The age at separation is
commensurate with the completion of an initial term of
enlistment of ^ years. Fig. 3.1 indicates a steady decline
in the number of enlistments at each age from 18 through 32
with a surprising number of individuals enlisting for the























































The numbers separating at each age declines steadily from
age 22 to age 35 at which point the number of separations
increases again reaching a peak at ages 37 and 38. This
peak coincides with the completion of a twenty-year career
at which time an individual may retire at 50 percent of his
base pay.
B. AGE AT REENTRY
Fig. 3-2 illustrates the age distribution of male prior-
service accessions between the ages of 19 and 35 for FY1975
through FYI98I . The small group of 19 year-olds represents
those persons who initially enlisted at 17 and served a
two-year term of enlistment. The age of 35 is the upper
limit for which no age waivers are required for a veteran
returning to active duty. Also, beyond age 35 the percent
of total prior service accessions for any age is less than
O.k-fo with a frequency per age of less than 100. The
majority of individuals returning to active duty were in the
21 to 26 age bracket with a peak at the 23 year old point.
This peak parallels the age at separation illustrated in
Fig. 3.1.
Table 1^ demonstrates that of those individuals returning
to active duty during the time period FYI975-FYI98I the
majority, 51 . 8?5 t were in the 22-25 age bracket. The next
largest number of returning personnel fall into the 26-29
age bracket, 27.23% followed by the 30-35 year olds with






accessions, 19-21 year-olds, accounts for the remaining 9.68%.
The percentages presented are based on 106,906 records from a
total of 107, 812 records scanned. (The missing 906 records







Army Navy Force Corps DoD
.28 .05 .27 .28 (298)
1.82 .24 2.93 2.21 (2565)
6.15 1.42 10.24 7.48 (799*0
12.42 5-84 17.39 13.^1 (14339)
14. 69 12.24 18. 31 15.00 (16035)
13.35 13.5^ 15.24 13.40 (14323)
10.98 12.97 10.86 11.27 (12049)
9.28 13.23 8.00 9-49 (10149)
7.67 11.23 5.52 7.57 (8088)
6.30 9.06 3.88 5.89 (6299)
4.77 6.06 2.69 4.17 (4459)
3. 81 4.60 1.80 3-24 (3^59)
2.71 3. 81 1.16 2.34 (2497)
2.25 2.62 .74 1.77 (1888)
1.61 1.53 -55 1-18 (1258)
1.04 .99 .29 .78 (835)
.87 -5o .13
-53 (571)
(N) (48241) (39104) (11166) (8395) (106906)
C. AFQT - MENTAL CATEGORY
Mental category is determined by the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) administered when an individual
initially applies for enlistment in the armed forces. The
mental category of an individual is one criterion on which





















specialty to offer the prospective recruit. The more tech-
nically oriented occupations are reserved for the higher
mental category recruits. The military would like to
recruit all mental category I personnel but this is not
possible. Over the years the largest percentages of
personnel have been in mental categories II, IIIA, and IIIB.
For purposes of comparison in this study categories IYA
,
IVB, IVC and V were consolidated into one category, IV-V.
Data on the mental category of those veterans returning
to active duty indicate that a larger percentage of
returning veterans fall into mental category II (see Table
15) • The percentages of accessions in categories II through
IIIB for the entire Department of Defense are fairly cons-
tant but there are wide disparities among the individual






FY I II IIIA IIIB IV-V UNK
75 3.01 24.88 15. 81 19.74 16.86 19.71
76 2.86 23.62 17.89 19.54 15-84 20.25
77 2.40 25.79 18.20 22.33 13.76 17.52
78 3.17 26.79 21.04 24.11 12.85 12.04
79 2.83 27.24 21.60 26.49 11.94 9.90
80 2.87 28.29 23.12 27.51 10.39 7.81
81 3.03 26.74 23.97 29.89 9.51 6.86
As demonstrated in Table 16, the Air Force has the
largest percentage of accessions in mental categories I and
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II for each fiscal year 1975 to 1981 . Both the Army and the
Navy have a high percentage of accessions in mental category
IV-V. The Marine Corps has an inordinate percent of acces-
sions whose mental category is unknown. Over the years
under consideration that percentage does decline hut even in
FYI98I 21.35$ of "the Marine Corps accessions mental category
were unknown.
Table 16
AFQT Comparison hy Service
FY1975-FY1981




Army 2.21 2.48 1.89 2.43 2.47 2.69
Navy 4.06 3.43 3-07 3.93 2.97 2.96 3.20
A/F 6.85 7.10 5.44 6.23 5.24 4.04 4.07
M/C ,4o .36 .22 1.25 1.44 2.16 2.05
Army 21.04 21.22 23.75
II
23.02 23.I6 24.23 21 086
Navy 32.77 29.99 30.90 30.58 30.10 29.52 28.46
A/F 38.75 38.77 40.77 38.20 38.32 37-78 37.75
M/C 4.76 4.52 3.50 14.18
IIIA
23.ll 23.90 24.08
Army 17.38 20.05 20.51 22. 66 22.07 21.99 21.63
Navy 15.34 16.50 17.26 18. 91 21.08 23.20 25.45
A/F 18.72 18.62 23.24 25.38 22.05 26.76 27.79
M/C 3-77 3. 81 3. 18 I6.56
IIIB
20.90 21.39 22.92
Army 23.95 22.97 25.82 28.36 31.83 33.22 36.43
Navy 17.58 19.14 21.24 21.72 22.40 24.92 26.51
A/F 12.02 16.12 18.99 18.97 22.05 21.67 23.01
M/C 6.61 6.55 7.23 18.57
IV-V
21.00 24.11 24.92
Army 20.32 19.08 16.27 15.71 14.42 13.47 13.24
Navy 15.67 16.13 13.33 13.23 12.04 10.52 8.49
A/F 7.87 4.79 4.52 5.26 5.39 4.78 4.04
M/C 6.68 5.48 3.83 4.39
UNK
5-37 5.37 4.68
Army 15.10 14.19 11.30 8.16 6.10 4.61 4.14
Navy 14.57 14.81 14.21 11.84 11.41 8.88 7.88
A/F 15.80 14.49 7.04 5.97 6.94 4.97 3.83




Age may be an acceptable proxy measure of individual
maturity, but it is an inadequate measure of skill level.
Within the armed forces an accepted measure of skill level
is paygrade. As indicated in Table 17. over the time period
FY1975-FY1981 the majority, of prior service accessions






FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
N 19^91 9011 11802 11146 I38I8 I8326 24878
Paygrade
El-2 .6 .7 .6 .6 .6 .8 .6
E-3 10.9 12.3 10.9 9.9 10.1 11.3 10.8
E-4 52.0 51-6 57.7 57.9 58.1 56.4 55.2
E-5 31.3 30.4 26.1 25.8 24.9 25-3 26.6
E-6 4.8 **-5 4.4 5.3 5.8 5.8 6.4
E7-9
-4 • 5 •3 .4 • 5 .4 • 5
In contrast with the separation paygrade illustrated in
Table 17. Table 18 indicates that of those who returned to
active duty 65^-72% reenlisted in paygrades E-3 and E-4, a
reduction on the average of one paygrade. This supports the
earlier discussion in Chapter I regarding the punitive








FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
N 18275 9011 11797 11146 13791 18434 2487
E-l 4.6 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.3 • 9
E-2 14.5 15-0 12.3 10.9 11.4 10.4 10.4
E-3 24.8 27.8 25.7 25.9 27.1 28.8 25.6
E-4 39.7 38.0 45.8 44.1 42.0 40.1 41.4
E-5 14.0 15.7 12.5 14.5 13.8 15.4 17.3
E-6 2.1 2.2 2.2 3-1 3.7 3-7 4.1
E7-9 . 2 .4 .2 • 3 .4 • 3 • 3
Indeed, some of the most important regulations governing
prior service accessions are those which establish the
individual's returning paygrade. A returning veterans
reentry paygrade is determined by a combination of his
initial separation paygrade and the length of broken
service. Table 19 indicates by fiscal year the distribution
of paygrade loss of returnees across DoD. The data show






FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
N 19493 9011 11809 11146 I38I8 18438 2487
L0PG
51.3 58.0 60.3 62.3 60.4 62.6 65.2
1 20.1 22.8 23-3 23.I 23.9 23.O 21.5
2 14.3 13.7 12.2 11.1 11.9 11.3 10.5
3 7.6 5.2 3-9 3.1 3-1 2.7 2.6
4+ 6.5 .3 .4 .4 .7 .4 .2
L0PG Loss of Paygrade
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Table 20 indicates percentages of individuals by length
of broken service (LOBS) and paygrade loss who returned to
active duty during FY1975-FY1981 . The paygrade loss is the




Paygrade Loss by Length of Broken Service
FY1975-FY1981
Reduction *
1 2 3 b
LOBS (mos) (N)
0-3 86.3 7.6 2.3 1.4 2.4 14979
4-6 83.4 12.3 2.4 • 9 1.0 15227
7-9 76.6 17.5 3.3 1-3 1.4 10297
10-12 76.9 17.2 3.2 1.3 1.5 9568
13-15 74.0 18.8 4.6 1.5 1.0 7801
16-18 74.2 18.7 ^•3 1.6 1.2 6842
19-24 73.1 19.6 4.2 1.9 1.2 12654
25-30 34.9 55-0 6.9 1.9 1.5 7975
31-48 30.7 26.7 32.8 8.0 1.8 16810
49+ 16.4 32.3 35.6 14.2 1.5 I3883
Additional insight can be gained by looking at the same
data in a different manner. Table 21 indicates the percent-
ages of prior service accessions suffering a loss of
paygrade by their length of broken service. Through the 18
month point the figures represent the number of accessions
on a quarterly basis. Between 19 and 30 months the figures
are based on the accessions for six month time periods and
there are 18 months of accessions between 31 and 48 months.
Finally, any accessions with 49 months or more of broken
service are consolidated into the category 49+ months.
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Table 21 indicates that 59-6^ of those who have returned
to active duty have done so without a loss in paygrade. Of
those who have returned to active duty, 5^.7% returned
within one year of separation.
Table 21
DoD
Length of Broken Service by Paygrade Loss
FY1975-FY1981
Reduction
1 2 3 4
LOBS(mos)
0-3 19.3 ^•5 2.5 ^.5 20.5
4-6 12.8 7.4 2.7 2.9 9.2
7-9 11.7 7.2 2.5 2.8 8.3
10-12 10.9 6.5 2.2 2.7 7.6
13-15 8.6 5-9 2.6 2.6 4.7
16-18 7.5 5.1 2.2 2.4 5.1
19-24 13.8 9.9 3-9 5.2 8.6
25-30 4.1 17.5 4.1 3.3 6.8
31-48 7.7 17.9 40.6 29.8 17.2
49+ 3.4 18.2 36.7 43.7 12.2
(N) (59.6) (22.2) (12.3) (4.1) (1.7)
(107812) (64240) (24075) (13272) (4443) (1782)
Over the years covered by this study the percentages of
persons returning by length of broken service have remained





Length of Broken Service by Fiscal Year of Entry
FY1975-FY1981
FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
N 19493 9011 11802 11146 I38I8 18438 24877
LOBS(mos)
0-3 16.2 14.1 15.1 13.5 11.8 11.2 11.8
4-6 8.1 10.3 10.9 H.2 10.8 10.7 9.6
7-9 8.1 9-9 8.6 9.6 9.0 10.5 9-3
10-12 8.1 7-2 8.5 9.0 8.4 9.0 9.1
13-15 6.6 5-7 7-3 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.2
16-18 6.0 5.6 6.0 6.7 5.9 5-6 6.5
19-24 11.9 11.4 11.7 11.6 12.0 10.0 11.0
25-30 7.7 7-3 6.5 6.5 7.6 6.5 7.0
31-48 19.0 14.8 13.1 12.7 14.1 14.9 13-6
49+ 8.3 13.9 12.2 11.8 13.3 1^-5 15.0
Table 23 shows that of the approximately 81,000 prior-
service accessions from 1 July 1975 through 30 September
1981
,
50.9% reenlisted for a four-year term of enlistment.
Two-year enlistments accounted for 20.9$ of the returnees,
followed by three-year termers at 20.1$ and with only 7*57$






Army Navy Force Corps DoD
TOE (N)
.02 .03 .01 •13 .03 (26)
1 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 (12)
2 .05 43.28 .05 64.93 20.90 (17065)
3 38.06 4.17 .08 17.67 20.14 (16442)
4 60.74 32.15 99.76 16.84 50.90 (41564)
5 .24 .89 .02 .05 .44 (359)





Veterans returning to active duty are for the most part
between the ages of 21 and 26. The largest percentage of
prior service accessions, 17«^» were age 23 at the time of
their reenlistment.
The largest percentage of returning veterans are in
mental category II, IIIA and IIIB. However, the extremely
large percentage of people whose mental category is not
known casts doubt on the reliability of these data.
The majority of prior service accessions initially
separated in paygrades E-4 and E-5 and reenlisted in pay-
grades E-3 and E-4. Over the years FY1975-FY1981 51-3% to
65.2% of returnees reenlisted with no loss in paygrade.
However, the majority of those returning without a loss
in paygrade returned within one year of separation, Table 20.
The majority, 50 . 9/£> of prior service accessions from 1




IV. PRIOR SERVICE ATTRITION
Attrition, as defined for use within this study, is the
loss of an individual from active duty status prior to
completion of his enlistment contract. Within the armed
forces there are ten major official categories (Interservice
Separation Codes, ISC) for the separation of an individual
from active duty. Each of these ten categories has numerous
sub-categories which further define the specific reasons for
an individuals' release from active duty. Table 2^ lists
the ten major Interservice Separation Codes and a complete
listing of sub-categories is provided in Appendix C.
Table Zh
Interservice Separation Codes (ISC)
Released from active service
1 Medical disqualifications
2 Dependency or hardship
3 Death
h Entry into officer programs
5 Retirement (other than medical)
6-8 Failure to meet minimum behavioral
or performance standards
9 Other separations or discharges
The separation data obtained from DMDC was grouped
according to ISC for each fiscal year 1975-1981. Table 25
illustrates the cumulative percentages of DoD prior service







Percent Losses by Interservice Separation Code
FY1975-FY1981
FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
ISC
29.79 27.97 24.24 11.70 7.52 1.01 1.72
1 3.69 3.69 3. 18 2.44 I.65 .96 .45
2 2.25 1-95 1.71 1-35 .76 .33 .06
3 .60 .48 .46 .28 .26 .20 .07
4 2.24 1.90 1.68 2.47 2.51 2.64 .65
5 .74 .57 .26 .22 .10 .09 .04
6-8 14.53 12.15 11.08 8.68 6.52 3-87 1.09
9 1.9 1.88 1.86 2.15 1-87 1.48 .64
-ETS 23.68 20.70 I8.53 15.09 11.14 6.90 2.32
The two categories accounting for the largest percentages
of losses are: Released from active service (0) and Failure
to meet minimum behavioral or performance standards (6-8).
Within category the assumption is that the specific reason
for discharge was an expiration of enlistment contract.
Category 6-8 however, accounts for those persons who failed
to meet behavioral or performance standards and were released
from active duty. Because individuals were discharged
with an ISC of 6, 7 or 8 does not necessarily mean that
they did not complete their term of enlistment. Many
marginal performers are allowed to remain in hopes that the
military life-style and proper leadership will turn them
around. For many immediate supervisors the special eval-
uation process required to discharge an individual for failure
to meet minimum behavioral or performance standards is too
time consuming and too much trouble to go through for the
marginal performer. Therefore, the sub-standard behavior
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and/or performance is noted in the individuals' regular
evaluations and the person is not recommended for reenlist-
ment. Because an enlisted person must have the
recommendation of his reporting senior/commanding officer
in order to reenlist it is easier not to recommend a person
and not allow him to reenlist than to go through the special
evaluation process.
A. ENTRY AGE
Data presented in Table 26 indicates that over the
FY1975-FY1981 time period age at time of entry does not
impact significantly on the attrition rate of prior service
accessions.
As stated previously, within the military an accepted
measure of personnel quality" is the attainment of a high'
school diploma. For this reason prior service attrition
data was divided into two major categories: high school
graduates (HSG) and non-high school graduates (NHS). The
high school graduate category consists of all persons having
received a diploma plus those who have some college edu-
cation. The non-high school graduates include all personnel
who have not attained a high school diploma plus those who
have attained a General Education Diploma (G.E.D.). As
noted in previous comparisons there is a significant differ-
ence in attrition between high school and non-high school
graduates. This difference is demonstrated in the age
57

brackets of Table 26 showing aggregate attrition for




Attrition by Age at Entry
FY1975-FY1981




























































































Table 27 illustrates the attrition rate of prior service
individuals by education level (HSG/NHS) for FY1975-FY1981
.
The data is grouped by the fiscal year of entry of the
individual thus the declining length of service (LOS) from
FYI975 to FY1981. For example, the cumulative attrition
rate for those individuals separating from active duty
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within 18 months of reenlistment has been declining from a








FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
mos
6 HSG 2.9 3-5 3-8 2.9 2.5 2.5 1-8
NHS 4.8 6.7 4.8 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.2
12 HSG 6.7 7.0 6.8 5.6 4.6 4.5 2.2
NHS 10.5 12.3 9.0 7.8 6.2 5-7 2.8
18 HSG 10.2 9.9 9-2 8.0 6.8 6.0
NHS I5.6 16.5 12.6 10.6 9.1 8.1
24 HSG 13.1 12.3 11.7 10.2 8.9 6.4
NHS 20.1 19.7 16.2 I3.9 12.1 8.6
30 HSG 15.1 14.1 I3.5 11.7 10.0
NHS 23.1 21.7 18.2 I6.3 14.0
36 HSG 16.7 15.3 15.1 13.0 10.3
NHS 24.8 23.2 20.0 18.1 14.4
42 HSG 17.7 16.3 16.0 13.5
NHS 26.1 24.2 20.9 18.7
48 HSG 18.7 17.4 17.0 14.0
NHS 27.3 25.1 21.8 I9.3
54 HSG 19.4 17.8 17.3
NHS 28.2 25.7 22.3
60 HSG 20.2 18.
3
17.6
NHS 29.I 26.2 22.8
66 HSG 20.9 18.7
NHS 30 . 26
.
7








Although individuals reenlisting fiscal years 1975 and
I976 may have served more than six years on active duty the
length of service for Table 27 was limited to 72 months
because the maximum term of enlistment is 72 months. This
time limit also reduces data contamination by those who
completed their initial term of reenlistment and subse-
quently reenlisted for a third term but did not complete the
third enlistment contract.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 graphically illustrate the data
presented in Table 27 for high school and non-high school
graduates respectively. As demonstrated in these figures
the attrition rate of prior service accessions has been
declining rather steadily and leveling off earlier in the
last two or three years when compared to the first two years
of this study.
Fig. 4.1 shows that by the end of seventy-two months,
21.6% of those high school graduates returning to active
duty in FY1975 have left active duty prior to completion of
their contract while 30*8% of "the non-high school graduates
have left active duty, illustrated in Fig. 4.2. This
difference of 9 • 2% would appear to be significant.
Between 1 July 1975 and 30 September I98I 20.7% of the
total number of prior service accessions were non-high
school graduates. The data raises a question concerning the
effectiveness of recruiting policies which recruits one
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non-high school graduate of which one third will attrite.
This is opposed to the recruiting of high school graduates
who comprise approximately 80$ of the prior service acces-
sions of which only one fifth will attrite.
The prior service attrition curves illustrated in Figures
4.1 and 4.2 are linear after the 48 month point due to the
grouping of length of service after 48 months. The cumula-
tive attrition rate for the 48+ months length of service was
divided by the number of 6 month intervals remaining to a
maximum of 72 months. The percent change by time period was
then added to the previous attrition rate to obtain the
percent attrition for the new length of service. Thus the
attrition rate per 6 month interval is equal after the 48
month point.
The curves are very steep to the 24 month point at which
time the attrition rate per time period begins to decline.
This leveling is commensurate with data presented in Table
28 which indicates that the majority of attrites occur
within 18 months of reenlistment.
Table 28 is a comparison of the attrition rate at the 18
month length of service to the total attrition through 30
September 1981. As the data indicates the majority of
personnel attriting did so within 18 months of reenlistment.
The 18 month percentages of the total attrition rate for
FYI98O and FYI98I are high because not all personnel
entering within those years have completed 18 months on
63

active duty since reenlisting. Based on an average four
year enlistment the majority of attritions occur before an




18 Month Attrition vs Total Attrition
FY1975-FY1981
18 mos
18 mos Total % of Total
FY75 11.38 23.68 48.06
FY76 11.19 20.70 54.06
FY77 9.87 18.53 53-26
FY78 8.57 15.09 56.79
FY79 7.24 11.14 64.99
FY80 6.50 6.90 94.20
FY81 2.32 2.32 100.00
C. BRANCH OF SERVICE
Over the years under study the Air Force prior service
attrition rate has been significantly lower than the other
three services. This is most likely due to the small
numbers of prior service personnel the Air Force recruits,
12817 between 1 July 1975 and 30 September 1981 , and the
reported high standards required of these individuals. The
individual service tables and respective graphs from which









FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
LOS
(mos)
6 HSG 3.6 3.9 4.4 2.7 2.4 2.1 2.0
NHS 5.3 9.1 5.2 3.7 3.2 2.6 2.5
12 HSG 7.6 7.4 7.4 5.9 5-1 4.6 2.4
NHS 11.2 14.0 8.6 8.1 6.9 5-6 3.2
18 HSG 11.2 10.0 9-8 8.9 7-5 6.7
NHS 16.2 17.4 12.3 11.5 11.2 8.5
24 HSG 14.2 11.9 12.5 11.5 9-9 7.3
NHS 20.4 20.8 16. I5.5 14.1 9.0
30 HSG I6.3 I3.8 14.8 13.1 11.0
NHS 23.7 23.0 18.7 18.6 16.2
36 HSG 18.0 15.4 17.0 14.8 11.5




NHS 27.0 25.8 22.5 - 21.5
48 HSG I9.8 17.8 19.2 16.1
NHS 28.3 26.9 23.9 22.2
54 HSG 20.6 18.
3
19.4
NHS 29 • 3 27 . 5 24 .
4
60 HSG 21.3 18.8 19.7
NHS 30.3 28.0 24.8
66 HSG 22.1 19.3
NHS 31 . 3 28 . 5
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FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
LOS
(mos)
6 HSG 1.7 3-1 3-3 3-1 2.5 2.7 1.8
NHS 2.0 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.1 3.8 2.2
12 HSG 5.6 6.9 6.7 5.3 4.3 4-. 6 2.1
NHS 8.3 10.9 9-0 7.3 6.3 6.3 2.8
18 HSG 9.1 10.4 9-2 7.2 6.5 5.8
NHS 14.2 16.4 12.4 10.1 8.6 8.3
24 HSG 12.1 13.4 11.4 9-3 8.3 6.0
MS I9.5 19.4 16.2 12.9 H.5 9.0
30 HSG 14.0 14.9 12.7 10.8 9-6
NHS 21.2 21.2 17.4 14.6 I3.6
36 HSG 15.4 I5.6 13.4 11.7 9-8
NHS 23.0 22.5 18. 5 -16.2 I3.7
42 HSG 16.5 16.5 14.2 12.1
NHS 24.2 23.3 19.1 16.8
48 HSG 17.7 17.4 14.9 12.4




NHS 26.5 24.8 20.3
60 HSG 19.2 18.
3
I5.5
NHS 27.4 25.4 20.9
66 HSG 20.0 18.7
NHS 28.4 26.0
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FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
LOS
(mos)
6 HSG 1.4 1.3 1.9 2.0 3.2 2.8 1.5
NHS 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.9 0.0
12 HSG 3.2 4.0 4.0 3.8 4.2 4.2 1.8
NHS 1.4 5-1 8.6 4.9 2.7 3.9 1.1
18 HSG 5.2 6.2 5.8 6.0 5.3 5-2
NHS 5-5 8.5 11.4 6.6 2.7 6.7
24 HSG 7.2 8.3 7.3 7.3 6.7 5-7
NHS 6.9 8.5 14.3 9.8 6.7 6.7
30 HSG 9-0 10.2 9.1 8.5 7.1
NHS 11.0 8.5 17.2 11.5 6.7
36 HSG 10.7 11.8 10.5 9.4 7-3
NHS 13.7 10.2 20.0 11.5 6.7
4-2 HSG 12.1 13. 2 11.4 9.8
NHS 16.4 11.0 21.4 12.3
48 HSG 13.7 14.7 12.2 10.3
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FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
LOS
(mos)
6 HSG 3.6 4.8 3.1 4.3 2.6 2.5 1-7
NHS 5.0 6.1 5.8 3.7 1.0 1.1 1.8
12 HSG 7-7 7.7 5.3 8.1 3.8 4.4 2.2
NHS 9.7 11.2 10.6 9.1 3.5 3.9 1.8
18 HSG 11.6 10.9 8.3 10.5 6.0 5.5
NHS 14.5 14.7 14.3 H.5 4.2 5-5
24 HSG 14.0 13.1 11.3 11.3 8.7 5-6
NHS 20.0 18.1 17.3 14.0 7-3 5-5
30 HSG 16.6 15.1 12.3 12.9 9-3
NHS 22.2 20.5 19.5 16.1 9-0
36 HSG 17.4 16.4 13.1 14.0 9.5
NHS 23.3 21.6 21.0 17.3
.
9-7
42 HSG 17.8 16.9 13.9 14.6
NHS 24.1 22.4 21.1 17-7
48 HSG 18.2 17.3 14.7 15-1
NHS 25.0 23.2 21.3 18.1
54 HSG 18.6 17.7 15.1
NHS 25.1 23.6 21.5
60 HSG 19.0 18.0 15.5
NHS 25.3 24.0 21.6
66 HSG 19.4 18.4
NHS 25.5 24.4
*





Tables 33 and Jk compare for each fiscal year, the
cumulative attrition rate with total discharge rate by
mental category of the individual. Table 33 contains high
school graduates while Table 3^ contains the non-high school
graduates. The purpose of comparison is to determine what
percentage of the annual discharges occurred prior to
completion of the enlistment contract for each mental cate-
gory. As demonstrated by the data a very large percentage
of all discharges occur prior to completion of contract.
For high school graduates in Table 33 observation of any
fiscal year indicates that the percentage of total dis-
charges by mental category are fairly constant. The same
holds true for the attrition rate. This constancy of
percentages indicates that the attrition rate of prior
service accessions is not significantly affected by mental
category.
Table Jk presents a similar picture for non-high school
graduates. For almost any fiscal year the attrition rate
for non-high school graduates is approximately 50% of the
total number of discharges within any given mental category.
Almost without exception the attrition rate for non-high
school graduates is higher than that of high school grad-
uates. This is true even in mental categories I and II.
Comparison of Table 33 and 3^ raises a question concerning
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categories I and II if their probability for non-completion
of enlistment is substantially greater than a lower mental
category high school graduate. The largest percentages of
attrition occurred in FYI98O and FYI98I for both high





Total Discharges vs Attrition ( -ETS
)
FY1975-FY1981
FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
Mental Catego ry
I&II
Total 54.96 49.01 43.94 26.24 18.43 9.44 3.53
-ETS 21.02 19.39 18. 69 14.51 11. 37 6.71 2.49
-ETS %
of Total 38.25 39.56 42.54 55.30
IIIA
61.69 71.08 70.54
Total 53.94 49.73 44.61 29.25 17.45 9-79 3.26
-ETS 24.63 21.69 20.20 18. 30 12.23 8.90 2.77
-ETS %
of Total 45.66 43.62 45.28 62.56
II IB
70.09 90.91 84.97
Total 51 .67 47.33 42.91 25.00 17.56 7.59 3-78
-ETS 23.98 20.71 20.00 16.25 11.40 6.92 2.98
-ETS %
of Total 46.41 43.76 46.61 65.OO
IV
64.92 91.17 78.84
Total 52.22 60.61 42.55 25.98 17.53 8.73 3.04
-ETS 23.44 26.90 18. 92 16.74 11.51 8.35 2.40
-ETS %
of Total 44.89 44.38 44.47 64.43
UNK
65.66 95.65 78,95
Total 54. 81 50.28 42.23 30.00 24.17 14.17 6.61
-ETS 19.43 16.80 13.60 10.42 1.91 4.53 1.51
-ETS %







Total Discharges vs Attrition (-ETS)
FY1975-FY1981
FY 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
Mental Catego ry
I&II
Total 60.73 53-78 46.69 32.15 23.23 9.45 5.3^
-ETS 30.46 27.76 23. 18 19.02 15.58 9.13 4.27
-ETS %
of Total 50.16 51.62 49.65 59.16
IIIA
67.07 96.61 79.96
Total 59.48 57.03 49.49 37.65 25.83 11.99 4.99
-ETS 33.31 34. 18 25.26 21.92 16.84 11.20 4.54
-ETS %
of Total 56.00 59.93 51.04 58.22
IIIB
65.20 93.41 90.98
Total 60.16 52.06 52.23 37.23 28.04 11.97 4.84
-ETS 33.23 25.47 25.27 23.12 19.32 11.-71 3-95
-ETS %
of Total 55-24 48.92 48.38 62.10 68.90 97.83 81.61
Total 58.58 56.37 51.67
IV
42.29 28.22 10.12 2.26
-ETS 30.48 27.28 27.63 23.15 19.56 9.55 1.13
-ETS %
of Total 52.03 48.39 53-^7 54.74
UNK
69.31 94.37 50.00
Total 63.88 55-80 49.27 33.71 24.16 7.00 4.80
-ETS 25.98 24.45 18.00 14.83 8.40 5.09 1.27
-ETS %
of Total 40.67 43.82 36.53 ^3-99 3^.77 72.71 26.46
E. SUMMARY
Age at the time of reenlistment has little bearing on the
attrition rate of prior service accessions.
Within any fiscal year the largest percentage of attrities
for all services are non-high school graduates. Even in the
upper two mental groups non-high school graduates account
for the largest percentage of attrites.
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Over the past two or three fiscal years the attrition
rate of prior service accessions has been declining
suggesting that there are external factors which affect the
attrition rate of prior service accessants.
80

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. CONCLUSIONS
With a declining youth population from which to recruit
personnel the armed forces must find new sources of qual-
ified personnel to man its units. As demonstrated in this
thesis there is a large pool of veterans available for reen-
listment. They present a good source of personnel in that
they have already been indoctrinated toward the military
life-style, are experienced with the equipment and require
little or no additional training thus reducing the costs of
placing an individual in an operational billet.
Veterans have always been a part of recruiting but there
has never been a concentrated emphasis on their recruitment.
Even with the technically advanced hardware in todays modern
military where there is a growing need for experienced
personnel the services are not actively seeking to recruit
veterans. For example, the Navy in FYI98I limited prior
service accessions to a maximum of 1 ,000 per month and this
quota was normally filled in the first week of each month.
Between 1 July 1975 and 30 September I98I the armed
forces of the United States have discharged some 3*5 million
male veterans who had at least two years on active duty. Of
this number approximately 2,052,000 were eligible for reen-
listment at the time of their discharge.
81

This thesis focused on the specific age bracket of 19 to
35 year-olds as a pool of personnel available for reenlist-
ment. This age bracket accounted for 46.?$ of the total
available pool, some 1.6 million individuals. Of the
veterans discharged in this age bracket 68.3% °f them were
eligible for reenlistment.
From 1 July 1975 through 30 September 1981 the military
has accessed approximately 106,000 veterans with two or more
years on active duty. This is only Jfo of the available pool
and only 6.5% of the 19 to 35 year-old pool. The numbers
and percentages presented in this study indicate that there
is and has been a gross under utilization of this pool of
experienced personnel.
The military generally has measured recruit quality by
the proxy measures of mental category and education level.
Data in this study indicated that, after two years of
service, mental category does not significantly affect an
individuals eligibility to reenlist upon initial separation
nor the attrition rate of those who do reenlist.
The one "quality" measurement which consistently
partions personnel is the possession of a high school diploma.
'.Vithin this study the high school graduate category
consisted of all personnel possessing a high school diploma
and/or some college. The non-high school category consisted
of all personnel who did not possess a high school diploma
plus those who had attained a General Education Diploma
82

(G.E.D.). As the data indicated in 'Chapter II, 52.5% of
non-high school graduates were reenlistment ineligible.
Similar percentages hold for each mental category. The
majority, 58. 51?° of separating 19 year-olds are ineligible
for reenlistment. Between 70.0% and 90.5% of the non-rated
personnel separating are also ineligible for reenlistment.
The largest percentages of initial separations occur in
paygrades E-4 and E-5 and the majority of these personnel
are eligible for reenlistment. Data on the length of
service of the available pool indicates that the majority
61.0%, of separations occur prior to, or at the six year
point. The paygrades E-4 and E-5 are commensurate with the
length of service requirements for advancement which can be
achieved during a four to six year enlistment.
Data presented in Chapter III on the actual prior service
accessions indicates that the majority, 52.8% of returning
veterans are between the ages of 22 and 25- The distri-
bution of prior service accessions by mental category is
fairly constant for each of the fiscal years 1975 "to 1981.
The majority of prior service accessions initially separated
in paygrade E-^ and returned in paygrades E-3 and E--4-. The
majority, 5^'7%t of veterans returning to active duty
without a loss in paygrade did so wixhin one year of initial
separation. After the 18 month point of broken service the




The attrition rate of prior service accessions has little
relationship to the age at the time of reenlistment as
indicated by the data presented in Chapter IV.
Within any fiscal year the largest percentage of attrites
for all services are non-high school graduates. This is
true even in the upper mental categories, I and II.
The majority, 50*9%* of prior service accessions reenlist
for four years. Over the time period under consideration
between 48.1$ and 65.0$ of those persons who have attrited
did so within 18 months of reenlisting thus indicating that
they are not completing half of their reenlistment contract.
With such a large pool of experienced personnel available
more prior service people should be accessed. They possess
the skills, know-how, maturity and corporate knowledge
needed by today's modern military.
B. FURTHER RESEARCH
The data presented tends to support reevaluation of prior
service recruiting policies. The data questions the reen-
listment of non-high school graduates, over half of which
will not complete their new enlistment contract.
Further research needs to be conducted in the area of
skill degradation to determine if the paygrade reductions
for returning veterans based on their length of broken
service are inappropriate.
This thesis did not attempt any in-depth statistical
analysis thus leaving many areas open for further analysis.
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It is felt that there are external factors which affect the
decision of veterans to return to active duty and the
performance of marginal personnel. Most noteably is the
civilian unemployment rate and the relative wage structure
of civilian occupations.
Although the active recruitment of these experienced
personnel appears to be highly desirable if the majority of
them return within one year of separation it would seem that
improvements in the retention programs may prevent them from
ever leaving the service. This area may lend itself well to
a cost-benefit analysis of programs for increasing the
recruitment of prior service personnel compared with
programs for increasing retention.
Further analysis should be conducted in the area of
performance comparison between the prior service accession
and his non-prior service counterpart who never left active
duty. A comparison in performance as reported by regular
evaluations and by promotion achievement would seem appro-
priate. Advancement in paygrade could be compared in terms
of how long did it take the respective individuals to
achieve the next higher paygrade . Does the prior service
accessant achieve rank faster than, slower than or at the
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RATING/RATE L ISTS (MALE)
RATES)CREQ (CATEGORIES (
CREO
RATING GROUP E-4 S=5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 NOTES
AB A _ _ _ _ A A
AC A A A B A A B (10)
AQ A A A B B D -
AT A A A C B C -
AV A - - - - - -
AW A A A c C B B
AX A A A A B B -
BT A A A B B A A
CTT A A A B B C B (8)(9)
DS A A B A A B A
EM A A A A B A A (3)
ET A A A B 3 C A (3)
EW A A B A A c A (8)(9)
FT A - - - - B A (3)
FTG A A A A A - - (3)
FTM A A A A A - - (3)
GMG A A A C A - - (1)
GMM A A B A A - -
GMT A A A A A C A
GS A - - - - A A (8)
GSE A A B B A - - (8)(9)
GSM A A A A B - - (8)(9)
HT A B A A B B 3
IC A A A A A D - (3)
IM A A A A A B -
IS A A B A B C B (8)(9)
MM A A A A B c A (3)
MR A B A B B A A
OM A A A 3 C A -
OS A B A A B A A
QM A B B A B A A
STG A A A A A A A
ABE B B B A A mm _
ABH B B A D B - -
AE B C A C B A -
AF B - - - - - 3
AG B B A B B B B (10)




CREO CATEGORIES (RATES )
CREO
RATING GROUP E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 NOTES
AME B C A C D _ _ (3)(8)(9)
AO 3 c A B C 3 C (3)
ASE B B B - - - -
BU B A A B C C - (8)(9)(U)
CTI B A A B C B B (3)(8)(9)(U)
CTM B A B C B C C (3)(8)(9)
CTR B A B C C C B (8)(9)
DP B B C C B A A (10)
DK B A A D B B 3
EN B A A B C D C (3)
FTB B B B B C - - (D(3)(8)(9)
GM B - - - - 3 C
LI B B C C A C B
LN B - A C 3 3 3
MA B - - 3 B B A (3)
ML B B A D B B C
MN B A C C B C A (8)(9)
MU B A B C C C 3 (9)
NC B - - A C B C
OT B B A C B A A
PM B B A D B - -
RM B A A C C C A (3)
RP B B B B B B B (D(8)(9)
SM 3 B 3 A B D A
ST B - - - - - 3
STS B A C A B A - (l)(3)
TD B A B C B A B (10)
TM B A B C C A A (3)
ABF C C B C B _ _
AD C C B C C C - (3)
AMH C D A C C - - (3)
AMS C D B C C - - (3)
AS C - - C B A B
ASM C D C - - - -
AZ C A C B B A A
BM C B B C C C C






RATING GROUP E-4 E- 1
?.
E-6 E-7 E-8 2-9 NOTES
CM C D B C C C _ (8)(9)U1)
CTA C A C C c B B (8)(9)
CTO C C 3 C c C C (8)(9)
cu C - - - - - C (2)
DM C B B D D B E (1)
DT c D C C B C B (8)(9)
EA c B A D B B - (8)(9)(U)
EO c C C D C C - (8)(9)(U)
EQ c - - - - - C (2)
HM c D C C C D C (3)(8)(9)
JO c B B C B D B (8)(9)
MT c C C C C - - (D(3)(8)(9)
MS c A C D D B C (3)
PC c B B C B C B
PH c D B D D D B (10)
PI c - - - - - C
PN c C C B D C C (3)
PR c C B C D A B (8)(9)
SH c B B D C C D
SK c A B C C B C (3)
SW c C B D C C - (8)(9)(U)
UT c C B D B B B (8)C9)(U)W C BBCCDC(3)
AM D - - - - D - (3)
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Since female goals do not exist for entry by women the








(1) NO DPEP INPUTS ALLOWED.
(2) NO PRIOR SERVICE INPUTS ALLOWED.
(3) SEE OPEN SKILLS LIST FOR CERTAIN QUALIFICATION/NECS IN
THIS RATING WHICH ARE NOT GOVERNED BY CREO GROUP OF
RATING.
{k) CNMPC (NMPC-21) APPROVAL TO EFFECT REENLISTMENT OR MAKE
OPERATIVE AN EXTENSION SUBSEQUENT TO THE FIRST REENLIST-
MENT FOR ALL PERSONNEL WITH LESS THAN TEN YEAR DAY-FOR-
DAY ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE.
(5) MUST HAVE SERVED IN THE APPLICABLE 82XX BILLET FOR 3
YEARS DURING THE LAST ENLISTMENT OR ONE YEAR WITHIN THE
LAST b YEARS, THE TOTAL ELAPSED TIME OUT OF THE APPLIC-
ABLE 82XX BILLET NOT TO EXCEED 3 YEARS (NOT APPLICABLE
TO FEMALE LIST)
(6) MUST HOLD CURRENT CERTIFICATION OF FIRST CLASS SWIM
QUALIFICATION PRIOR TO SUBMITTING UNDER. THIS NEC (NOT
APPLICABLE TO FEMALE LIST).
(7) RATING CONVERSION FOR PERSONNEL IN THE SEAL/UDT, EOD OR
DIVER CLOSED LOOP SNEC COMMUNITY IS PREDICATED UPON THE
MANNING LEVEL OF EACH SOURCE RATING WITHIN THAT CLOSED
LOOP SNEC (NOT APPLICABLE TO FEMALE LIST).
(8) "A" SCHOOL REQUIRED FOR LATERAL CONVERSION.
(9) RATING ENTRY BY NON DESIGNATED PERSONNEL REQUIRES "A"
SCHOOL
(10) PERSONNEL APPLYING FOR SCORE SHOULD SUBMIT ALTERNATE
RATING CHOICES.
(11) RECALL OF USNR/USNR-R TO ACTIVE DUTY REQUIRES CNMPC
APPROVAL REGARDLESS OF CREO CATEGORY.
(12) DNMPC (NMPC-407) APPROVAL REQUIRED TO EFFECT REENLIST-
MENT OF PERSONNEL UNDER BROKEN SERVICE CONDITIONS OF







Separation Paygrade (SEPPG) by Service
FY1975-FY1981
ARMY
Eligible Ineligible Unknown Total
SEPPG
E-l 5-76 88.27 5-97 41501
E-2 19.15 71.40 9.45 44814
E-3 35-75 58.66 5.60 107821
E-4 62.74 32.84 4.42 567957
E-5 67.47 26.59 5.94 316247
E-6 66.65 25.54 7.71 163385
E-7 52.95 40.52 6.53 107637
E-8 42. 34 50.64 7.03 21 8 50





E-l 3.55 88.75 7.71 27362
E-2 10.17 81. 63 8.19 44088
E-3 26.40 66.91 6.69 104051
E-4 73-89 22.52 3-59 209330
E-5 76.01 20.76 3.23 184064
E-6 61.33 37.08 1.59 119812
E-7 34.41 64.03 1.56 60154





E-l .64 98.46 .90 6747
E-2
• 55 98.80 ^5 8676
E-3 1.87 97.74 • 39 39130
E-4 71.39 25.76 1.85 376089
E-5 74.42 21.03 4.55 255475
E-6 57.95 33-79 8.27 151903
E-7 45.05 46.70 8.25 115757





E-l 3.64 93.36 3.01 29243
E-2 19.58 85.46 3.96 25202





E-4 65-3^ 33.95 .71 95748
E-5 7^.47 24.90 .63 83469
E-6 70.22 29.36 43 34105
B-7 66.66 33.07 .26 20233
E-8 45.67 54.19 .14 9308



































































































PART I i ENLISTED
00 Transaction (Immediate Reenlistment , Enlistment
Extension, Dropped from Rolls, Record Correction)
or Unknown
RELEASE FROM ACTIVE SERVICE
01 Expiration of Term of Service
FBK, FBL, JBK, KBK, KEA , KEC , LBK, MBK, MBN , MFA , MEC
02 Early Release - Insufficient Retainability
JBM, JED, KBM, LBM, LED, MBM
Air Force: J10
03 Early Release - To Attend School
KCE, KCF, MCE, MCF
0^ Early Release - Police Duty
KCG, MCG
05 Early Release - In the National Interest
JDJ, KCK, KDJ, MCK, MDJ
06 Early Release - Seasonal Employment
KCJ, MCJ
07 Early Release - To Teach
KCH, MCH
08 Early Release - Other (Including RIF)
JCC, JDM, JDR, KCC, KDM, KDR, KEB , LCC , LDM, LGJ, MCC
,
MDM, MDR, MEB, MGJ, XDM
Air Force: 711, 712, 715. 716, 717, 781, 782
1 MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATIONS
10 Conditions Existing Prior to Service
GFN, JFM, JFN, KFN
11 Disability - Severance Pay
JFL
12 Permanent Disability - Retired
RFJ, SFK, VFJ
13 Temporary Disability - Retired
RFK, SFK, VFK, WFK
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14 Disability - Non EPTS - No Severence Pay
JFR, LFR
15 Disability - Title 10 Retirement
16 Unqualified for Active Duty - Other
GFT, GFV, HFT, HFV, JFT, JFU , JFV, KFT, KFU , KFV, LFT,
MFT, XFT
2 DEPENDENCY OR HARDSHIP
22 Dependency or Hardship





Marine Corps: H24, 824
32 Non-Battle - Other
Army: 946
Navy: 880-891, 893-899
Marine Corps: H21-H23, H25-H59, 821-823, 825-859,
H3I, H4G, H5I, 82B, 82E, 821, 83B, 83C , 83I, 84B,
85B, 85D, 851
33 Death - Cause Not Specified
Air Force: 474
4 ENTRY INTO OFFICER PROGRAMS
40 Officer Commissioning Program
KGL, KGM, KGN, KGS , KGX , MGX





5 RETIREMENT (OTHER THAN MEDICAL)
50 20-30 Years of Service
JBD, KBD, NBD, RBD , SBD





RBB, VBK, XBK, XDS
6 FAILURE TO MEET MINIMUM BEHAVIORAL OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
60 Character or Behavior Disorder
GMB, GMK, HMB, JMB , JMK, KMB
61 Motivational Problem (Apathy)







65 Discreditable Incidents - Civilian or Military
GKA, GLB, HKA, HLB , JKA , JLB
66 Shirking
GKJ, GLJ, HKJ, JLJ, JKJ, JLJ
67 Drugs
BLF, GKK, GLF, GMM, GPB , HKK, HLF , HMM, JKK , JLF, JMM,
JPB
68 Financial Irresponsibility
GKE, GLG, GMH, HKE , HLG , HMH , JKE , JLG, JMH , KLG
69 Lack of Dependent Support
GKH, GLH, HKH, HLH, JKH, JLH
70 Unsanitary Habits
GLK, GMP, HLK, HMP, JKV, JLK, JMP
71 Civil Court Conviction
GKB, HKB, JKB
72 Security
BDK, GDK, HDK, JDK, LDK
73 Court Martial
GLB, HJB, JJB, JJC, JJD
7^ Fraudulent Entry




GKD, GKF, HKD, HKF , JKD
Army, Navy, Air Force, JKF
76 Homosexuality
BLC, BML, DLC, GKC , GLC , GML, GRA , GRB , GRC , HKC , HLC
,
HML, HRA, HRB, HRC , JKC , JLC , JML
77 Sexual Perversion
GKLM GLL, GMF , HKLM HLL, HMF , JKL, JLL , JMF
78 Good of the Service
BFS, DFS, JFS, KFS, KNL
79 Juvenile Offender
JFE
80 Misconduct (Reason Unknown)
BNC, GNC, HNC, JFP , JHM, JNC
81 Unfitness (Reason Unknown)
BLM, JNG, KLM
82 Unsuitability (Reason Unknown)
BHJ, BHK, BMN, CBL, GHJ, GHK, GMN , HHJ, HMN , JHK
Army, Marine Corps, Air Force: JHJ
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force: KMN
8^ Basic Training Attrition
85 Failure to Meet Minimum Qualifications for Retention
JGF, JHE, KGF
Army, Navy, Marine Corps: JGZ
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force: LEM, LET, LGH
Navy, Marine Corps: JEM, JET, JGH
86 Expeditious Discharge
Army: JGH, LGH, KMN
Navy: JHJ
Marine Corps: JFG (8)
Air Force: JEM, JGH
87 Trainee Discharge
Army: JEM, JET, JNF , LEM, LET, LNF
Marine Corps: JFG (9)
Air Force: JET, JGZ
OTHER SEPARATIONS OR DISCHARGES
90 Secretarial Authority




91 Erroneous Enlistment or Induction
JFC , KFC , LFC , MFC , YFC











FDG, JDG, KDG, LDG, MDG
98 Breach of Contract
JDP, KDP, KDQ, KDS, LDP, MDP , MDS , XDP
99 Other
FBC, FND, GHF, JBB , JBC , JBH , JCP , JDN , JHD , JHF , JND
,
KBH, KBJ, KCP, KDN, KFG, KHD , KHF , KND , KNF , LBH , LBN,
LFG, LND, MDN, MFG, MHD, MND, MNF , VNF , XND , YCP , YDN
YND
Army, Navy, Air Force: JFG
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force: JNF , LNF
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